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BYPASSING REDUNDANCY: RESOLVING THE 
JURISDICTIONAL DILEMMA UNDER THE DEFENSE 
BASE ACT 
Claire Been 
Abstract: In 1941, Congress passed the Defense Base Act (DBA) to provide workers’ 
compensation coverage to civilian workers employed overseas under U.S. government 
contracts or on U.S. military bases. Congress modeled the DBA after the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (Longshore Act),1 modifying certain provisions to 
provide for accidents that occur overseas. In 1972, Congress amended the procedures 
governing review of claims under the Longshore Act. The amendments required workers to 
appeal claim-related decisions to a new administrative board and then to a U.S. court of 
appeals. Before the amendments, a worker’s first appeal under the Longshore Act was to 
federal district court. Because the amendments failed to mention the DBA, the U.S. courts of 
appeals have disagreed over whether judicial review of administrative decisions under the 
DBA should take place in district courts, as it previously did, or in the courts of appeals, 
mirroring the changes to the Longshore Act. The resulting uncertainty has led to 
inconsistency in administration of the DBA and to difficulty for this growing class of 
workers. This Comment argues that context, statutory canons, legislative history, 
construction of other Longshore Act extensions, and policy considerations establish that 
review of final agency decisions in DBA cases must be in the courts of appeals. 
INTRODUCTION 
It sounds like the opportunity of a lifetime.2 You are a truck driver, 
and a recruiter calls to tell you about a new prospect: a truck-driving job 
that triples your current pay.3 The catch? You will be working for a 
government contractor, living in a war zone, driving across the Iraqi 
desert to provide supplies to American service personnel. You take the 
offer. Just five weeks into your new job, your convoy is attacked, and 
you are seriously injured. Back in the United States, facing permanent 
                                                     
   1. Congress originally titled the Act “Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.” 
See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927). In 
1984, Congress amended the Act, changing the name to the “Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act.” See Pub. L. No. 98-426, § 27(d)(2), 98 Stat. 1654 (1984) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 901 (2000)). This Comment cites versions of the Longshore Act both before and after the 1984 
change in title. Thus, for consistency, this Comment will refer to the Act as the “Longshore Act.” 
2. This hypothetical was created by the author for illustrative purposes. 
3. For an example of the significant increase in wages a civilian contractor might enjoy by 
working overseas, see Proffitt v. Service Employers International, Inc., 40 B.R.B.S. 41 (2006) 
(noting the ability of an overseas contractor to earn three times what he could earn in the United 
States). 
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disability, you learn that a statute, the Defense Base Act (DBA),4 
requires your employer to compensate you for your injuries. Congress 
passed the DBA in 19415 to provide workers’ compensation coverage to 
civilian workers employed overseas under U.S. government contracts or 
on U.S. military bases.6 You diligently file a claim with the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs,7 but your claim is plagued by 
difficulties. Your claim drags out for years as it winds its way through 
the administrative process, until it is finally denied and you are forced to 
appeal. You follow the agency’s instructions and file in the correct court 
of appeals. When the opinion comes down, you are appalled to read that 
your claim has been dismissed for jurisdictional reasons. By now, the 
statute of limitations has run, and it is too late to re-file in the correct 
court.8 
The number of civilian contract workers overseas has grown 
significantly in the past decade.9 Contract workers have become a 
                                                     
4. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651−1654 (2000). 
5. Defense Base Act, ch. 357, 55 Stat. 622 (1941) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1651−1654 (2000)). The DBA, originally passed to protect workers on lend-lease military bases, 
was amended in 1942 to cover employees working under government contracts outside of the 
United States. See Amendment to Defense Base Act, ch. 668, 56 Stat. 1028 (1942) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654 (2000)); see also Univ. of Rochester v. Hartman, 618 F.2d 
170, 173 (2d Cir. 1980) (“The Act was originally intended to cover civilians employed at overseas 
military bases . . . and was finally extended to protect employees fulfilling service contracts . . . .”). 
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (applying the DBA to workers suffering injury or death while working 
on any overseas military, air, or naval base acquired after 1940; any public work in any Territory or 
possession outside the United States if the employee is engaged in employment under the contract 
of a contractor; under a contract or subcontract entered into with the United States or any agency if 
the contract is to be performed outside the continental United States; or if employed by an American 
employer outside the United States providing services to the Armed Forces). 
7. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 919(a) (2000) (“[A] claim for 
compensation may be filed with the deputy commissioner in accordance with regulations prescribed 
by the Secretary [of Labor] at any time after the first seven days of disability.”); see 20 C.F.R. § 
702.201 (2000) (establishing in the Employment Standards Administration an Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs (OWCP)); id. § 702.202 (vesting the OWCP with authority to administer 
the Longshore Act and DBA). 
8. For a discussion of the consequences of dismissing a DBA case, see Pearce v. Director, Office 
of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]ere we to dismiss . . . 
[the claimant] would probably be held to be time barred by [33 U.S.C. § 921(b)]. And if he were to 
seek a new hearing under [33 U.S.C. § 919], he might well be met with an argument that his 
application should be denied on the ground of administrative res judicata, or the doctrine of finality 
of administrative action.”). There are two cases by the name of Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs that will be cited in this Comment, one from the Ninth Circuit and one from the 
Seventh Circuit. 
9. Renae Merle, Census Counts 100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2006, at D1−2 
(“[One hundred thousand] is also 10 times the estimated number of contractors that deployed during 
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critical part of U.S. military operations overseas because of costs, 
executive limitations on personnel, and the military’s need for workers 
with highly technical skills.10 There were more than 100,000 civilian 
contract workers in Iraq at the end of 2006,11 and U.S. employers who 
are awarded government contracts must secure DBA insurance to cover 
all of their overseas workers, regardless of the worker’s nationality.12 So 
far, no court of appeals has dismissed a DBA claim for jurisdictional 
reasons, but this scenario is not farfetched.13 Nothing protects an injured 
claimant from having his or her case dismissed in this fashion.14 
The DBA is an extension of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act (Longshore Act),15 and takes most of its operative 
and procedural provisions from the Longshore Act.16 In 1972, Congress 
amended the procedural provisions of the Longshore Act but did not 
state whether these amendments affected the DBA.17 These amendments 
created a new administrative review board that took the place of review 
                                                     
the Persian Gulf War in 1991, reflecting the Pentagon’s growing post-Cold War reliance on 
contractors . . . .”). 
10. See Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors under Military Law, PARAMETERS: U.S. ARMY 
WAR C. Q., Autumn 2007, at 83−84 (“[A] combination of technology, budget constraints, and 
personnel shortages forced the military to rely heavily on contractors.”); see also THE JUDGE 
ADVOC. GEN.’S LEGAL CENTER & SCH., OPERATIONAL L. HANDBOOK 137 (Maj. Derek I. Grimes et 
al. eds., 2006) (“[I]n some deployed areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the executive branch has 
limited the number of U.S. military personnel who can be deployed to those countries at any one 
time. When these limits, known as “force caps” are in place, contractors replace Soldiers . . . .”). 
11. See Merle, supra note 9. This estimate includes contractors of all nationalities. 
12. See DEP’T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, DEFENSE BASE 
ACT: WORKERS’ COMPENSATION FOR EMPLOYEES OF U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 
WORKING OVERSEAS 1 (2003), http://www.dol.gov/esa/owcp/dlhwc/ExplainingDBA.pdf 
[hereinafter OWCP WORKERS’ COMPENSATION] (explaining that all employees working in covered 
employment positions must be covered by the DBA, regardless of nationality). 
13. In one case the worker was saved from this result only by a discretionary judicial transfer. See 
Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 807−08 (4th Cir. 1997) (transferring the worker’s case to the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland as the proper forum to hear the appeal). 
14. See Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“We transfer this case, rather than dismissing it, because we see no reason to require Pearce to start 
all over again . . . .Transfer keeps the case before us alive . . . .”). 
15. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901−950 (2000). 
16. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a)(1) (2000) (“Except as herein modified, the provisions 
of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act . . . shall apply in respect to the injury or 
death of any employee . . . .”); see also OWCP WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, supra note 12, at 2 
(explaining that the DBA adopts the Longshore Act with only a few exceptions). 
17. See Pearce, 603 F.2d at 767 (“The 1972 Amendments to the [Longshore] Act did not 
explicitly amend the Defense Base Act.”). 
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formerly performed by federal district courts, and provided for further 
review in the U.S. courts of appeals.18 
The U.S. courts of appeals have disagreed over the impact of these 
amendments on the correct judicial forum for appeals under the DBA.19 
Some courts have determined that proper jurisdiction after exhaustion of 
administrative proceedings is in the district court,20 as it has always been 
under the DBA. Other courts have found that the DBA incorporated the 
1972 Longshore Act amendments and that judicial review should begin 
in the courts of appeals.21 Requiring review in the federal district court is 
erroneous and has several negative policy implications. First, initial 
review in district court is duplicative because district court review 
receives no deference when the case is reviewed on appeal.22 Second, the 
uncertainty created by the circuit split may force parties to file in 
multiple courts.23 Third, and most importantly, this jurisdictional debate 
tends to prolong DBA cases, which is harmful and costly to all parties 
involved.24 This Comment applies traditional tools of statutory 
construction to the DBA and the Longshore Act and concludes that 
judicial review of final agency decisions should take place in the U.S. 
courts of appeals. 
Part I of this Comment explains the history and purpose behind the 
DBA and the Longshore Act, including amendments altering the 
jurisdictional scheme. Part II explores the reasoning that courts have 
used when reconciling the textual provisions of the DBA and Longshore 
Act. Part III examines relevant tools of statutory construction, explains 
how courts have interpreted Longshore Act extensions other than the 
DBA, and explores policy concerns. Finally, Part IV argues that 
examination of the DBA using traditional tools of statutory construction 
supports the finding that the U.S. courts of appeals are the proper forum 
for judicial review of cases under the DBA. 
                                                     
18. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, § 14, 86 Stat. 1251, 1261 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 919 (2000)). 
19. See infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
20. See infra Part II.A. 
21. See infra Part II.B. 
22. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. Quinones, 206 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (according no deference 
to the district court’s decision). 
23. See, e.g., Docket at 1, Serv. Employers Int’l, Inc. v. Zimmerman, No. 06-3903-ag (2d Cir. 
Jan. 17, 2007) (filing in two district courts and one court of appeals). 
24. See infra notes 160−163 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE DBA IS AN EXTENSION OF THE LONGSHORE ACT 
WITH UNIQUE MODIFICATIONS 
The DBA provides workers’ compensation coverage to civilian 
contract workers employed overseas by private contractors under U.S. 
government contracts or on U.S. military bases outside the United 
States.25 Congress modeled the DBA after the Longshore Act, which 
provides workers’ compensation coverage to waterway workers.26 The 
procedures governing the review of claims under the two acts were 
nearly identical when the DBA was first enacted, providing for appeal of 
final administrative decisions in federal district court.27 When Congress 
amended the Longshore Act’s procedural scheme in 1972, it did not 
amend the DBA and did not indicate whether the Longshore Act’s 
amendments should apply to the DBA.28 
A.  The Original Versions of the DBA and the Longshore Act Both 
Provided for Appeal of Final Administrative Decisions in Federal 
District Court 
The Longshore Act, originally enacted in 1927,29 provides workers’ 
compensation coverage30 for workers injured on navigable waterways or 
adjoining areas.31 Historically, the procedures of the Longshore Act 
                                                     
25. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). 
26. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) 
(codified as Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act at 33 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (“Judicial proceedings . . . shall be instituted in the United States district 
court of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose 
compensation order is involved . . . .”) (emphasis added); Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970) (amended 1972) (“If not in accordance with the law, 
a compensation order may be suspended or set aside . . . through injunction proceedings . . . 
instituted in the Federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred.”) 
(emphasis added). 
28. See infra Part I.C. 
29. ch. 509, 44 Stat. at 1446. 
30. Workers’ compensation coverage provides benefits such as salary compensation, medical 
benefits, or death benefits for injuries or deaths occurring on the job. For a summary of benefits 
provided by and the operation of the Longshore Act, see Gerald Bober & Michael Wible, 
Compensable Injury or Death Arising Under the Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 
35 LOY. L. REV. 1129 (1990). 
31. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (2000) (“[C]ompensation shall be payable . . . if the disability or death 
results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any 
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining 
area . . . .)”). Certain exceptions to Longshore Act coverage exist. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio R. 
Co. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 47 (1989) (excluding employees whose job functions are not integral 
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provided informal review through the Office of Workers’ Compensation 
Programs.32 If informal procedures were unsuccessful, the deputy 
commissioner of the Office of Workers Compensation Programs33 then 
decided the merits of the worker’s case.34 The worker could appeal the 
deputy commissioner’s final determination35 under section 21 of the 
original Longshore Act, which provided that “[i]f not in accordance with 
the law, a compensation order may be suspended or set aside . . . through 
injunction proceedings . . . instituted in the Federal district court for the 
judicial district in which the injury occurred.”36 
Congress passed the DBA in 1941 as an extension of the Longshore 
Act.37 The DBA states: “[e]xcept as herein modified, the provisions of 
the [Longshore] Act . . . as amended . . . shall apply.”38 Through this 
language, Congress provided that procedures governing review of claims 
under the DBA mirrored those of the Longshore Act.39 The choice to use 
parallel procedures is understandable in light of one of the purposes of 
the DBA: “to provide substantially the same relief for injuries or death 
                                                     
to the loading or unloading of ships); P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 83 (1979) (excluding 
truck drivers delivering supplies to maritime locations); Boomtown Belle Casino v. Bazor, 313 F.3d 
300, 304 (5th Cir. 2002) (excluding workers on floating casinos under a “recreational operation” 
exception). See generally Thomas Fitzhugh, III, Who is Covered? Recent Cases Regarding 
Longshore Situs and Status, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 265 (2004). 
32. See Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Administrative Claims Handling at the District Director’s Office, 
in THE LONGSHORE TEXTBOOK 1, 1−5 (Steven M. Birnbaum, et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999) (discussing 
the informal procedures provided through the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs). 
33. The deputy commissioner was the administrator of claims through Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, which is part of the Department of Labor. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 137 (1995) (“Before the 
1972 amendments to the [Longshore Act], the OWCP Director’s predecessors as administrators of 
the Act, officials called OWCP deputy commissioners, adjudicated [Longshore Act] claims in the 
first instance.”). The Secretary of Labor substituted the title “district director” for “deputy 
commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 702.301 (2000) (“The substitution is for administrative purposes only 
and in no way affects the power or authority of the position as established by statute”). The title 
“district director” is now used, but for purposes of this Comment, the terms are interchangeable. See 
FITZHUGH, supra note 32, at 1 (“Since 1972 their title has changed: deputy commissioners are now 
district directors.”). 
34. See FITZHUGH, supra note 32, at 1. 
35. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970) 
(amended 1972). 
36. Id. (emphasis added). 
37. See S. REP. NO. 77-540, at 1 (1941) (“Section 1 of the bill extends the provisions of the 
[Longshore] Act.”). 
38. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). 
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-1070, at 1−2 (1941). 
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of employees at bases . . . as existing law affords similar employees in 
the United States . . . .”40 
B. The DBA Included a Specific Provision Governing Appeals from 
Agency Decisions in DBA Cases, Which Differed from the 
Analogous Longshore Act Provision 
A blanket adoption of the jurisdictional provisions of the Longshore 
Act would have left injured workers with claims arising under the DBA 
without a forum for judicial review41 because most, if not all injuries 
sustained under the DBA occur overseas in no American judicial 
district.42 To avoid this undesirable outcome, the drafters of the DBA 
inserted a provision in the DBA that reads: “[j]udicial 
proceedings . . . shall be instituted in the United States district court of 
the district wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner 
whose compensation order is involved.”43 This alteration is the only 
difference between judicial review provisions in the DBA and the 
original Longshore Act.44 
C. Amendments to the Longshore Act Altered the Statutory Scheme for 
Judicial Review of Claims Arising Under the Longshore Act, While 
Leaving the DBA Untouched 
A little more than thirty years after Congress enacted the DBA, it 
amended the Longshore Act to change the structure of administrative 
                                                     
40. Id. at 2. 
41. See S. REP. NO. 77-540, at 1 (making provision for “extension of existing compensation 
districts . . . to include the [overseas] bases” this statute will cover). 
42. Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[I]n 
most, if not all, Defense Base Act cases, the injury or death would not occur within any federal 
judicial district . . . .”). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (emphasis added). The location of the deputy commissioner’s office is 
determined based on where the injury occurred. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (2000) (“Such claim shall be filed with the deputy commissioner in the 
compensation district in which such injury or death occurred.”). Congress gave the Secretary of 
Labor the authority to extend Longshore Act compensation districts to include overseas areas, and 
the Secretary accomplished this by promulgating a regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 704.101 (2000). 
Currently, overseas injuries under the DBA are reported to five different offices based on 
geographical area. See FITZHUGH, supra note 32, at 2. 
44. See AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he 
procedures applicable to file a claim under the DBA and to obtain an initial determination of the 
claim are the very procedures set forth in the [Longshore Act] for a claim arising under that Act.”). 
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proceedings and judicial review under that Act.45 The amendments, 
passed in 1972, made three main procedural changes.46 First, the 
amendments assigned an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review 
disputed claims, replacing the function previously performed by the 
deputy commissioner.47 Second, they created an administrative board, 
the Benefits Review Board (Board), to review ALJ determinations.48 
Third, they provided judicial review of Board decisions in the U.S. 
courts of appeals.49 The courts and agencies that have interpreted these 
amendments have taken the view that Congress intended to directly 
substitute Board review for the review process formerly performed by 
federal district courts,50 completely writing the district courts out of the 
statutory scheme.51 A modern day claimant under the Longshore Act 
who disagrees with the determination of an ALJ first appeals to the 
Board.52 The claimant then has the option to petition for review “in the 
United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury 
occurred.”53 
The 1972 amendments significantly streamlined and clarified the 
Longshore Act’s procedural scheme,54 but the legislative history of the 
                                                     
45. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, §§ 14–15, 86 Stat. 1251, 1261–62 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 919, 921 (2000)). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at § 14, 86 Stat. at 1261; see also Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 
F.3d 214, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (discussing how the amendments gave “hearing functions” of the 
deputy commissioner to ALJs). 
48. See Hice, 156 F.3d at 216 (discussing creation of the Benefits Review Board (Board)). 
49. See § 15(a), 86 Stat. at 1261 (“Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of 
the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the injury occurred.”). 
50. See In re Comp. under the Longshore & Harbor Workers’ Comp. Act, 889 F.2d 626, 629 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (“[I]n 1972 Congress created the [Board] to hear all direct appeals of compensation 
orders. This replaced the district court’s exercise of that function.”); U.S. Dep’t of Labor Benefits 
Review Board Mission Statement, http://www.dol.gov/brb/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2008) 
(“The Board exercises the appellate review authority formerly exercised by the United States 
District Courts. Board decisions may be appealed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals and to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.”). 
51. Congress eliminated the district court’s role in reviewing Longshore Act compensation 
orders. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, § 15(a), 86 Stat. 1251, 1261−62. 
52. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (2000) (“The 
Board shall be authorized to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial question of law or 
fact . . . .”). 
53. Id. § 921(c). 
54. See Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 385 F. Supp. 644, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (“The main reason 
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amendments does not indicate whether Congress intended the changes to 
apply to the DBA.55 Because Congress did not expressly refer to the 
DBA in the 1972 Longshore Act amendments or in the relevant 
legislative history, it is impossible to conclude that Congress considered 
any potential impact on the DBA.56 It is unclear whether congressional 
silence reflected a desire to maintain the status quo, or a belief that the 
1972 amendments would be automatically incorporated into the DBA. 57 
D. The 1972 Amendments Created an Inconsistency Between the DBA 
and the Longshore Act that Can Be Reconciled in Two Different 
Ways 
The changes to the Longshore Act could have altered the DBA in two 
ways. Under one interpretation, the plain “district court” language of the 
DBA’s jurisdictional provision mandates that review of agency 
determinations take place in district courts.58 The alternate interpretation 
requires review to take place in courts of appeals, as dictated by the text 
of the amended Longshore Act.59 
An interpretation of the complex relationship between the DBA and 
Longshore Act must begin with the text of the DBA. The opening clause 
of the DBA states: “[e]xcept as herein modified, the Provisions of the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act . . . as amended, 
shall apply.”60 According to this language, subsequent amendments to 
                                                     
for the amendments was to obviate the increased litigation costs and the unwarranted expenditure of 
court time under the old system.”). 
55. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972) (failing to refer to the DBA); see also Home Indem. Co. v. 
Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1979) (“Congress did not, however, whether through legislative 
oversight or intent, amend the judicial review provisions of the Defense Base Act.”). 
56. See Home Indem. Co., 597 F.2d at 90. 
57. See Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 889−90 (8th Cir. 1987) (“To draw a negative inference 
of congressional intent from vague or missing legislative history would be hazardous at 
best . . . . Furthermore, congressional inaction . . . is not sufficient to demonstrate approval for the 
practice.”). The only change Congress has made to the DBA subsequent to the 1972 amendments 
was to substitute the title “Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act” for 
“Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act” in 42 U.S.C. § 1653(a). See Pub. L. No. 
98-426, § 27(d)(2), 98 Stat. 1639, 1654 (1984) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)). 
58. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (2000) (“Judicial proceedings . . . shall be instituted in 
the United States district court of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy 
commissioner whose compensation order is involved.”). 
59. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000) (“in the 
United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred”) (emphasis added). 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (emphasis added). 
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the Longshore Act apply to the DBA,61 unless a specific DBA provision 
modifies the Longshore Act’s text.62 Where the DBA’s text departs from 
traditional Longshore Act provisions, the DBA controls.63 
Section 21 of the Longshore Act, before Congress amended it, read: 
“a compensation order may be suspended or set aside . . . in the Federal 
district court for the judicial district in which the injury occurred.”64 The 
DBA provides: “[j]udicial proceedings . . . shall be instituted in the 
United States district court of the judicial district wherein is located the 
office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation order is 
involved.”65 The post-1972 Longshore Act now requires judicial review 
of final agency determinations to take place “in the United States court 
of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred.”66 
 Because the DBA section governing judicial review specifically 
departs from the normal procedures of the Longshore Act, the section is 
a modification, which supersedes the Longshore Act’s now-inconsistent 
language.67 While it is clear a modification exists, there are two equally 
                                                     
61. While an interesting issue, incorporation of the 1972 Longshore Act amendments is not 
disputed between the circuits. All the courts have determined that the Longshore Act amendments 
were incorporated into the DBA. See, e.g., ITT Base Servs. v. Hickson, 155 F.3d 1272, 1274–75 
(11th Cir. 1998) (finding that the DBA incorporates provisions of the Longshore Act as long as they 
are consistent with the DBA); Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 
217–18 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that the 1972 amendments transferred the deputy 
commissioner’s hearing authority to the ALJ, and applying this change to the DBA); Lee v. Boeing 
Co., 123 F.3d 801, 804 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Congress amended section [9]21(b) of the [Longshore Act] 
to its current form and provided an initial level of administrative review to the newly created 
Board . . . . those procedures also apply to the DBA claims . . . .”); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. 
Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1113 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991) (“The DBA is a general reference statute that 
incorporates not only the version of the [Longshore Act] in force at the time the DBA was enacted, 
but all subsequent [Longshore Act] amendments as well.”); Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs, 647 F.2d 716, 724–25 (7th Cir. 1981) (remanding the case to the administrative 
law judge for a hearing, because the procedure had not complied with the requirements of the 
amended Longshore Act); Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 769 
(9th Cir. 1979) (finding the DBA incorporates the 1972 Longshore Act amendments, including the 
new Board procedures); Home Indem. Co. v. Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 88, 90 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding 
that the Board’s decision needed to be first appealed to the District Court). 
62. See ITT Base Servs., 155 F.3d at 1274 (“[T]he DBA’s general incorporation provision also 
states that when the provisions of the DBA modify those of the [Longshore Act], the DBA 
controls.”). 
63. Id. 
64. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970) 
(amended 1972). 
65. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (2000). 
66. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
67. See ITT Base Servs., 155 F.3d at 1275 n.5. 
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plausible interpretations regarding the scope of the DBA’s 
modification.68 If Congress intended every word of the DBA’s 
jurisdictional provision, section 3(b),69 to modify the incorporated 
Longshore Act language, then the “district court” language in the DBA 
would prevail, completely replacing the new “court of appeals” language 
in the Longshore Act.70 The Longshore Act provision—“in the United 
States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred”71—
would be inapplicable to DBA cases. Instead, the DBA provision—
“[j]udicial proceedings . . . shall be instituted in the United States district 
court of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy 
commissioner whose compensation order is involved . . .”72—would  
replace the contradictory Longshore Act language. Based on this view of 
the modification, judicial review under DBA cases must begin in the 
district courts, as dictated by the plain language of section 3(b).73 
Alternatively, Congress might have intended a more limited 
modification in the DBA—one that simply substituted the clause 
“wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose 
compensation order is involved” for the clause “in which the injury 
occurred.”74 It could be argued that the choice to include section 3(b) in 
the DBA was not to ensure review in district courts, but to guarantee that 
jurisdiction would be available for injuries overseas.75 Therefore, the 
modification was only of this later phrase, a limited change necessary to 
reflect the differences in the statutes’ geographical reaches.76 If this 
narrow view of the modification is accurate, the words “district court” in 
the DBA are not meaningful departures from the Longshore Act, and the 
DBA should incorporate the 1972 Longshore Act amendments that 
                                                     
68. See id. at 1275 (holding that judicial review of compensation orders under the DBA 
commences in district courts). Contra Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 
763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[F]or Defense Base Act cases, the proper court of appeals is in the circuit 
‘wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner.’”). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
70. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
71. Id. 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
73. Id.; see infra Part II.A. 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b); 33 U.S.C. § 921(c). 
75. See Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“[I]n most, if not all, Defense Base Act cases, the injury or death would not occur within any 
federal judicial district . . . .”). 
76. Id. at 770. 
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require review in the “court of appeals.”77 If this interpretation is 
followed, the review must begin in the courts of appeals, as required by 
the amended Longshore Act.78 The provisions together would read, in 
effect: “may obtain review of that order in the United States court of 
appeals for the circuit wherein is located the office of the deputy 
commissioner whose compensation order is involved.”79 
In sum, Congress modeled the DBA after the Longshore Act, 
borrowing most of its procedures, with the exception of the DBA 
provision governing judicial review of agency decisions. When first 
enacted, procedures for reviewing claims under the two Acts were nearly 
identical, providing for appeal of administrative decisions in federal 
district court. When Congress amended the Longshore Act in 1972, it 
failed to amend the DBA or to indicate whether the amendments should 
apply. These changes left room for two possible interpretations of the 
DBA jurisdictional provision and of the proper forum for review under 
the Act. 
II.  COURTS OF APPEALS DISAGREE OVER WHETHER THE 
1972 LONGSHORE ACT AMENDMENTS ALTERED THE 
FORUM FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DBA CASES 
In the absence of affirmative legislative guidance, circuit courts have 
split over whether the 1972 Longshore Act amendments changed the 
proper forum for judicial review in the DBA.80 The DBA explicitly 
incorporates the procedural provisions of the Longshore Act, as 
amended,81 but the 1972 Longshore Act amendments conflict with the 
DBA provision that mandates judicial review in district court.82 The 
                                                     
77. Based on this narrow view of modification, the only replacement necessary to effectuate the 
differences in the statute’s geographical reaches would be to substitute the words: “in which the 
injury occurred” with “wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose 
compensation order is involved.” Id. 
78. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c); see infra Part II.B. 
79. The italicized section is the DBA provision. 
80. See infra Parts II.A and II.B. The First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals have decided 
cases after the 1972 Longshore Act amendments without questioning the appropriateness of 
jurisdiction. See Univ. of Rochester v. Hartman, 618 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1980) (deciding that a 
university professor doing research was not covered by the DBA); Puig v. Standard Dredging Co., 
599 F.2d 467, 471 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming a decision of the Board arising from a DBA case). 
81. See Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (“Except as herein modified, the 
provisions of the [Longshore] Act . . . as amended . . . shall apply . . . .”). 
82. Id. § 1653(b) (“Judicial proceedings . . . shall be instituted in the United States district court 
of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation 
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Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that judicial review 
in DBA cases should remain in the district courts,83 noting the clarity of 
the “district court” provision in the DBA.84 The Ninth Circuit has held 
that judicial review should take place in the courts of appeals,85 
concluding that the 1972 Longshore Act amendments effectively 
repealed the “district court” provision in the DBA.86 
A. Four Circuit Courts Have Held that the DBA’s Plain Text Requires 
Judicial Review to Begin in the District Court 
Four circuits have concluded that appeals should begin in district 
court.87 In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit first pointed to 
the opening clause of the DBA, which begins: “[e]xcept as herein 
modified, the provisions of the [Longshore Act] . . . as amended . . . shall 
apply . . . .”88 Based on this language, the court determined that 
subsequent amendments to the Longshore Act should apply to the DBA, 
unless a specific DBA provision modifies the incorporated Longshore 
Act text.89 The Eleventh Circuit thus held90 that the DBA review 
provision,91 with its “district court” language, completely modified and 
replaced the corresponding Longshore Act provision.92 Under this view, 
                                                     
order is involved . . . .”); Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) 
(“in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the injury occurred . . . .”). 
83. ITT Base Servs. v. Hickson, 155 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district 
court has jurisdiction over DBA appeals from the Board); Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 805 
(4th Cir. 1997) (holding that jurisdiction in DBA cases must be in the district court); AFIA/CIGNA 
Worldwide v. Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that appeals still go to district 
courts); Home Indem. Co. v. Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that district courts 
are the proper forum for appeals in DBA cases); see also Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (leaving the precise issue undecided but transferring 
the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, as the Fourth Circuit has found 
review must be in district courts). 
84. See infra Part II.A. 
85. Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979). 
86. Id.; see infra Part II.B. 
87. See cases cited supra note 83. 
88.  See ITT Base Servs., 155 F.3d at 1274; Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000). 
89. ITT Base Servs., 155 F.3d at 1274 (“[T]he DBA’s general incorporation provision also states 
that when the provisions of the DBA modify those of the [Longshore Act], the DBA controls.”). 
90. Id. at 1275. 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
92. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000). 
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the express “district court” language prevailed,93 and the Eleventh 
Circuit transferred the case to the district court.94 
The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have similarly held, based on 
this plain text rationale, that federal district courts have jurisdiction over 
DBA cases.95 The District of Columbia Circuit also expressed approval 
of the plain-text rationale of these other circuits, although the issue was 
not squarely before that court.96 In deciding a DBA case, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that the language of the DBA is unambiguous, and 
concluded that any modification of the plain text would be tantamount to 
judicial legislation.97 While not explicitly addressing the issue of 
modification, these courts seemed to agree implicitly with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s view.98 In the Fourth Circuit case, however, Judge Hall 
                                                     
93. See ITT Base Servs., 155 F.3d at 1275 (“Our conclusion is dictated by the unambiguous 
language of the DBA . . . . The mandate of this provision does not allow us to apply the flatly 
inconsistent language of the [Longshore Act] . . . .”). 
94. Id. at 1276 (transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida). 
95. See Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 1997); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. 
Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991); Home Indem. Co. v. Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 90 (6th 
Cir. 1979). 
96. See Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“While Congress’s use of the phrase ‘in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which 
the injury occurred’ leaves us inclined to agree with the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, we need 
not decide that issue for ourselves.”). Hice was decided based on whether the appeal should be 
brought in the circuit where the compensation order at issue originated or the circuit where the 
office of the ALJ who tried the case is located. Id. at 217–18. For a more in-depth discussion of this 
aspect of DBA cases, see infra note 158. The D.C. Circuit found that proper jurisdiction was in the 
Fourth Circuit, and therefore transferred the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maryland. Id. at 218. As the Fourth Circuit in Lee had already found jurisdiction was proper at the 
district court level, the Hice court did not need to reach this issue. See Lee, 123 F.3d at 805; Hice, 
156 F.3d at 218 (“Because we have held that under the Defense Base Act the location of the district 
director-here, Baltimore-identifies the location of judicial review . . . and because the Fourth Circuit 
has plainly held that cases arising within its jurisdiction should be heard first by U.S. District 
Courts, we transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland.”). 
97. AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide, 930 F.2d at 1116 (“As the language of the DBA is free from 
ambiguity, jurisprudential modification of its plain statutory language would amount to judicial 
legislation.”); see also Home Indem. Co., 597 F.2d at 90 (“Congress did not, however, whether 
through legislative oversight or intent, amend the judicial review provisions of the Defense Base 
Act. Accordingly, we are bound to apply the current statutory scheme until Congress dictates 
otherwise.”); Lee, 123 F.3d at 806 (holding that the DBA “unambiguously provides that initial 
judicial review . . . lies in the district court”). 
98. These circuits explained that they must wholly apply either the DBA provision or the 
Longshore Act provision. If the Longshore Act clause governed, there would be no forum for 
review at all because jurisdiction is vested in “the circuit in which the injury occurred” and injuries 
under the DBA occur overseas. See Lee, 123 F.3d at 805 n.7 (“[I]f we adopted Lee’s argument and 
concluded that section 21(c) of the [Longshore Act] applies in DBA cases despite the express 
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dissented, finding no congressional intent to force those who were 
injured overseas to “be compelled to rehearse their arguments before the 
district court prior to the inevitable appeal.”99 
B. The Ninth Circuit Held that the 1972 Longshore Act Amendments 
Changed the Forum for Judicial Review in DBA Cases to the 
Courts of Appeals 
The Ninth Circuit held that DBA appeals from final agency decisions 
should take place in the courts of appeals.100 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that although Congress modified the jurisdictional provision of the DBA 
to make it distinct from jurisdictional provisions of the Longshore Act, 
the words “United States district court” in the DBA were not a 
meaningful part of the modification.101 The court concluded that 
Congress’s mention of the “district court” in the DBA did not preclude 
incorporation of the 1972 Longshore Act amendment that required 
review in the courts of appeals.102 The court looked to the fact that the 
original Longshore Act text differed from the DBA jurisdictional 
provision, section 3(b), in only one respect.103 The DBA replaced “in 
which the injury occurred”104 with “wherein is located the office of the 
                                                     
mandate to the contrary . . . we would essentially foreclose any judicial review . . . .”); Home Indem. 
Co., 597 F.2d at 90 (applying the Longshore Act provision would foreclose judicial review); 
AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide, 930 F.2d at 1116 n.7 (explaining that under the Longshore Act scheme no 
circuit court would have jurisdiction to hear the appeal).  
99. Lee, 123 F.3d at 808 (Hall, J., dissenting). 
100. Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“[F]or Defense Base Act cases, the proper court of appeals is in the circuit ‘wherein is located the 
office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation order is involved.’”). The Ninth Circuit has 
heard subsequent cases on appeal directly from the Board, adhering to Pearce. See Kalama Servs., 
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 354 F.3d 1085, 1089−90 (9th Cir. 2004) (deciding 
a DBA case appealed directly from the Board); Kaneshiro v. Holmes & Narver, Inc., 60 F. App’x 
79, 80 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating it has jurisdiction in this DBA case appealed directly from the Board, 
but denying the petition for review); Parsons Corp. of Cal. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 619 F.2d 38, 40 (9th Cir. 1980) (deciding a DBA case appealed directly from the Board). 
101. Pearce, 603 F.2d at 770. 
102. See id. 
103. See id. (“The phrase ‘in the United States District Court’ is a specific reference to section 21 
of the [Longshore] Act, and is lifted from it. If it stood alone in section 3(b) of the Defense Base 
Act, it would be redundant, having been adopted by section 1(a) of the Defense Base Act . . . The 
language immediately following: ‘of the judicial district wherein is located the office of the deputy 
commissioner whose compensation order is involved’ is the modifying language. It is the only 
reason for the enactment of § 3(b) of the Defense Base Act.”). 
104. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970) 
(amended 1972). 
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deputy commissioner whose compensation order is involved.”105 The 
Ninth Circuit found this difference to be the heart of the modification 
and suggested that “district court” was included in the DBA simply to 
mirror the Longshore Act.106 Based on this more limited view of 
modification, the court concluded: 
When the 1972 Amendments to the [Longshore] Act abolished 
the jurisdiction of the district courts . . . , that change was 
adopted by the Defense Base Act . . . , and the phrase  ‘in the 
United States District Court’ in § 3(b) of the Defense Base Act 
became inoperative; in effect, it was repealed. The language 
immediately following [i.e., wherein is located the office of the 
deputy commissioner whose compensation order is involved], 
however, still had a role to perform.107 
Based on this construction, judicial review under both Acts takes 
place in the courts of appeals, as the Longshore Act amendments 
require,108 and judicial review under the DBA still occurs in the vicinity 
of the appropriate “office of the deputy commissioner.”109 The Ninth 
Circuit transferred the case to the Seventh Circuit as the proper circuit to 
hear the appeal.110 The Seventh Circuit accepted the transfer and decided 
the case on the merits but did not discuss the jurisdictional issue.111 
                                                     
105. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (2000). 
106. See Pearce, 603 F.2d at 770 (“The phrase ‘in the United States District Court’ is a specific 
reference to section 21 of the [Longshore] Act, and is lifted from it.”). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
110. Pearce, 603 F.2d at 771. The Ninth Circuit transferred Pearce’s claim to the Seventh Circuit 
because he incorrectly filed in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 771. The DBA requires injured workers to 
appeal in the circuit “wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation 
order is involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). Pearce, who was injured in Thailand, originally filed his 
claim with the compensation district in Hawaii. See Pearce, 603 F.2d at 765. He subsequently 
moved to Chicago, and the claim was transferred to the Chicago office for convenience. Id. 
Therefore, Pearce likely believed his appeal should be filed in the Ninth Circuit, as he had originally 
filed his claim there. The correct circuit was actually the Seventh, where the compensation order at 
issue had originated. See Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 647 F.2d 716, 717−20 
(7th Cir. 1981). 
111. Pearce, 647 F.2d at 721 (“We approve the holding of the Ninth Circuit that jurisdiction lies 
in the Seventh.”). It is unclear whether the Seventh Circuit approved of the Ninth Circuit’s 
determination that jurisdiction should take place in courts of appeals in all DBA cases, or whether it 
agreed that jurisdiction should be in the Seventh Circuit in this individual case. Therefore, it is 
unclear which position the Seventh Circuit will take in future DBA cases. While the Seventh Circuit 
has heard one DBA case since Pearce, it was appealed through a different Longshore Act provision, 
so it did not implicate the provisions at issue in Pearce. See Schmit v. ITT Fed. Elec. Int’l, 986 F.2d 
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In sum, courts have disagreed over whether the 1972 Longshore Act 
amendments changed the proper forum for judicial review in cases under 
the DBA. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that 
judicial review in DBA cases should stay in the district courts, finding 
that the unambiguous “district court” provision in the DBA governs. The 
Ninth Circuit has held that judicial review should now begin in the court 
of appeals, taking the narrow view of modification to find that the 1972 
Longshore Act amendments effectively repealed the “district court” 
provision in the DBA. 
III.  TOOLS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS ARE RELEVANT TO THIS 
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE 
Statutory interpretation first involves an examination of the plain text, 
including the context of related acts.112 If the plain text does not resolve 
the question, other canons of statutory construction, legislative history, 
and policy considerations aid in interpretation.113 Judicial and 
congressional treatment of other statutes based on the Longshore Act are 
useful for courts to consider when interpreting the DBA.114 
A. Plain Text, Context, and the Canon of In Pari Materia Are All 
Relevant When Interpreting Related Statutes 
When interpreting statutes, courts must first ask whether the statutory 
text has a plain and unambiguous meaning that answers the particular 
question.115 The Supreme Court has interpreted a plain text inquiry to 
include text and context.116 “[The] inquiry must cease if the statutory 
language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and 
                                                     
1103, 1105 (7th Cir. 1993) (hearing a case appealed to the district court under the Longshore Act 
provision 33 U.S.C. § 918(a), further appealed to the court of appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291). 
112. See infra Part III.A. 
113. See infra Parts III.A and III.C. 
114. See infra Part III.B. 
115. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (explaining that in all cases of 
statutory construction, the starting point must be the plain meaning of the language used by 
Congress); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., __ U.S. __ (Apr. 17, 2007), 127 S.Ct. 1534, 1552 
(2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We must begin, as we always do, with the text.”). 
116. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (discussing how ambiguity is 
determined through reference to the plain text and context); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 
U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute 
must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”). 
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consistent.’”117 This type of interpretation involves a holistic inquiry:118 
“[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 
reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that 
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”119 
The Supreme Court has defined context as the texts of the immediate 
and related acts.120 
When an examination of statutory context requires interpreting 
multiple related acts, the canon of construction in pari materia is also 
useful.121 When applying the doctrine of in pari materia, courts should 
construe statutes with similar language and which deal with the same 
subject matter together—as if they were one law.122 Statutes that are part 
of the same legislative scheme or that aim to accomplish similar 
purposes are considered in pari materia.123 When applying in pari 
materia, “[t]he proper comprehensive analysis reads the parts of the 
statutory scheme together, bearing in mind the congressional intent 
underlying the whole scheme.”124 
An example of a court applying in pari materia is seen in Linquist v. 
Bowen,125 where the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals grappled with the 
                                                     
117. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 
240 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
118. O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[A] court engaged in the task of 
statutory interpretation must examine the statute as a whole, giving due weight to design, structure, 
and purpose as well as to aggregate language.”). 
119. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341; see also Norman J. Singer, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48A:16, 919 (7th ed. 2007) (“Reference to a statute’s context to determine its 
plain meaning also includes examining closely related statutes . . . .”). 
120. See Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 199 
(1993). 
121. United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 564−65 (1845) (explaining that when a 
court interprets multiple statutes dealing with a related subject or object, the statutes are in pari 
materia, and applying it in the context of two statutes governing double rations provided to army 
soldiers and marines). 
122. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 (1972); see also Norman J. Singer, 2B 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.01, 170−75 (6th ed. 2000). 
123. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (stating it is “plain” that the Federal 
Farm Loan Act of 1916 and the Revenue Act of 1916 are in pari materia, as they were enacted by 
Congress in the same legislative session and deal with the same subject matter).  
124. Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying in pari materia because the 
Railroad Retirement Act provision incorporated the text of the Social Security Act, and considering 
“the congressional intent behind the entire worker retirement benefits scheme in determining how 
these Acts should be applied in tandem”). 
125. Id. 
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interrelation of the Social Security Act and Railroad Retirement Act.126 
Both federal Acts provided for a reduction in benefits if a retired 
worker’s outside income exceeded a certain level in a particular year.127 
Because of these provisions, individuals receiving benefits under both 
Acts were subject to a greater reduction than those receiving under one 
Act.128 The Eighth Circuit, in construing the Acts in pari materia, 
considered that the language was identical and that the purpose behind 
each act was to encourage all beneficiaries to work.129 The court noted 
that it would frustrate this congressional intent if a worker entitled to 
benefits under both Acts ended up receiving less than his or her 
counterpart receiving benefits under one Act.130 Based on these factors, 
the court determined that the two Acts must be read together, so the total 
reduction in benefits for a worker receiving under both Acts was no 
greater than the statutory limit under one Act.131 
B. Judicial Treatment of Other Longshore Act Extensions Provides 
Guidance in Interpreting the DBA 
Congress has used the Longshore Act scheme to provide workers’ 
compensation coverage for workers who are employed in a variety of 
situations.132 Courts have consistently construed these other acts so they 
remain in accordance with the procedures of the Longshore Act.133 
Judicial interpretation of two extensions, the Black Lung Benefits Act 
(BLBA)134 and the Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities Act 
                                                     
126. Id. at 889. 
127. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1982); Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. 
§ 231a(g)(2) (1982). 
128. See Linquist, 813 F.2d at 885–86. 
129. Id. at 889. 
   130.  Id. at 890.  
131. Id. 
132. In addition to the DBA, the Longshore Act’s provisions are referenced extensively in the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331−1356 (2000), the War Risk Hazard Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1701−1717 (2000), the Nonappropriated Funds Instrumentalities Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 
8171−8173 (2000) [hereinafter NFIA], and the Black Lung Benefits Act, Title IV of the Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901−945 (2000). 
133. See, e.g., Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 1342, 1351−52 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding 
subsequent Longshore Act amendments applied because Congress intended to place workers injured 
on the Outer Continental Shelf in the same position as longshore workers); Clark v. Crown Const. 
Co., 887 F.2d 149, 153 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding subsequent Longshore Act amendments applied to 
the Black Lung Benefit Act). 
134. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 (1972) (codified as 
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(NFIA),135 provide a useful analogy to guide resolution of issues 
presented under the DBA. 
An example of courts actively choosing to retain parallel procedures 
in a Longshore Act extension is seen in the BLBA, enacted in early 
1972,136 which amended the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 
1969.137 The Coal Mine Act incorporated most major provisions of the 
Longshore Act,138 similar to the DBA. When Congress amended the 
Longshore Act,139 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that 
its jurisdiction to review cases under the BLBA depended on whether it 
adopted the 1972 Longshore Act amendments.140 The Seventh Circuit, 
followed by other circuits who decided the issue, determined that 
subsequent amendments were incorporated automatically, ensuring that 
procedure for cases under the BLBA and Longshore Act would remain 
the same.141 
Courts have determined that another Longshore Act extension, the 
NFIA, incorporates the 1972 Longshore Act amendments requiring 
review in the courts of appeals.142 This extension, enacted prior to 
                                                     
amended at 30 U.S.C. §901 (2000)). 
135. NFIA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171−8173 (2000).  
136. 86 Stat. 153. 
137. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969) (codified 
as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 901) [hereinafter Coal Mine Act]. 
138. Section 422(a) of the Coal Mine Act, codified at 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), incorporates the 
provisions of the [Longshore] Act as amended. 
139. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-576, § 14, 86 Stat. 1251, 1261 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 901 (2000)). 
140. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d 310, 317 (7th 
Cir. 1977). 
141. See id. at 323−31. All other circuit courts that dealt with the issue also determined 
subsequent amendments were automatically incorporated. See Clark v. Crown Const. Co., 887 F.2d 
149, 155 (8th Cir. 1989) (“[T]his Court, and the Benefits Review Board, have jurisdiction to review 
black lung cases.”); Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Bd., 558 F.2d 685, 686, 688 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (emphasizing the importance of uniformity between the circuits in ending the “statutory 
muddle Congress created . . . .”); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Nat’l Mines Corp., 
554 F.2d 1267, 1274 (4th Cir. 1977) (finding a legislative intent to adopt subsequent amendments); 
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. E. Coal Corp., 561 F.2d 632, 638−39 (6th Cir. 1977) 
(finding “express intent” to adopt subsequent amendments). In 1977, Congress passed the Black 
Lung Benefits Reform Act to clarify that the 1972 Longshore Act amendments did apply to the 
BLBA, essentially adopting the determinations of these courts of appeals. See Black Lung Benefits 
Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. 
§901) (1977). 
142. NFIA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171−8173 (2000). 
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1972,143 posed a problem similar to that faced by the original DBA 
drafters: most injuries claimed under the NFIA would occur overseas 
and would not fall within the plain text of the incorporated Longshore 
Act provisions.144 To solve this problem, the NFIA drafters used a 
jurisdictional provision nearly identical to that in the DBA, providing 
district court jurisdiction over injuries that occurred “outside the 
continental limits of the United States.”145 The Seventh Circuit accepted 
jurisdiction in a case appealed straight from the Board, a new procedure 
implemented by the 1972 Longshore Act amendments.146 The court of 
appeals decided the overseas case on the merits without questioning the 
propriety of jurisdiction or reconciling the fact that the text of the NFIA 
itself dictates review in “district courts.”147 
C. Policy Considerations are Relevant to the Proper Scope of the 
DBA Modification 
The uncertainty regarding the proper jurisdiction for DBA cases has 
significant ramifications for the adjudication of claims for a growing 
class of workers.148 Forcing appeals from administrative decisions to go 
through both the district courts and courts of appeals potentially wastes 
judicial resources.149 First, each court reviewing a case under the DBA 
applies the same standard of review.150 Therefore, the district court and 
the court of appeals engage in the same review and analysis.151 The Fifth 
                                                     
143. See Nonappropriated Funds Instrumentalities Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 555 (1966). 
144. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000). 
145. 5 U.S.C. § 8171(d) (2000). 
146. See Symanowicz v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 672 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(deciding a workers’ compensation claim arising under the NFIA). 
147. See id. 
148. See Merle, supra note 9. 
149. Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 806 (4th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that its decision will 
result in a review procedure which is cumbersome and duplicative); cf. Howard v. Sec’y of Health 
& Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that duplication of time and effort 
wastes judicial resources where the district court and magistrate perform identical tasks). 
150. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152−61 (1999) (explaining that the main standard 
when it comes to review of administrative agency determinations is substantial evidence); Potomac 
Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 279 n.18 (1980) 
(explaining that courts review legal decisions of the Board de novo, as the Board is not a policy-
making body which deserves deference); Sisson v. Davis & Sons, Inc., 131 F.3d 555, 557 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“Our review of . . . Board decisions is limited to considering errors of law and ensuring that 
the . . . Board adhered to its statutory standard of review, that is, whether the ALJ’s findings of fact 
are supported by substantial evidence and are consistent with the law.”). 
151. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. Quinones, 206 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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Circuit addressed what deference it should give to the judgment of the 
district court in one of the first DBA cases appealed from a district court 
to a court of appeals.152 It accorded “no deference to the decision of the 
district court and proceeded as though reviewing the decision of the 
[Board] in the first instance.”153 
The circuit split has also created uncertainty in the law.154 For 
instance, Service Employers International v. Zimmerman155 is a DBA 
case that was pending in the Second Circuit and has since recently 
settled.156 In Zimmerman, the employer sought judicial review after 
Board proceedings, and filed in two district courts and a court of 
appeals.157 The employer filed in these courts to ensure that the case 
would continue in the event one of the reviewing courts found it did not 
have jurisdiction.158 Multiple filings are not only costly, but also create 
                                                     
152. See id. 
153. Id. (“In reviewing a district court’s decision on agency action in a different context . . . we 
have explained that ‘since an appellate court reviews the administrative decision on the identical 
basis as did the district court, appellate court review need accord no particular deference to the 
district court’s conclusion. . . .’ This reasoning applies equally in the case at hand, and we therefore 
accord no deference to the decision of the district court . . . .” (quoting La. Envtl. Soc’y, Inc. v. 
Dole, 707 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1983))). 
154. See, e.g., Docket at 1, Serv. Employers Int’l, Inc. v. Zimmerman, No. 06-3903-ag (2d Cir. 
Jan. 17, 2007). 
155. Id. 
156. See Order Approving Settlement Agreement, J.Z. v. Serv. Employers Int’l, Inc. (Office of 
Administrative Law Judges Dec. 21, 2007). 
157. See Brief for the Petitioner at 23 n.1, Serv. Employers Int’l, Inc. v. Zimmerman, No. 06-
3903-ag (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2007). 
158. See id. (“[C]ognizant of the prospect judicial review in this case might lie in the district court 
in which the office of the district director or the office of the ALJ is located, timely filed protective 
petitions for review in both the Southern District of New York and the Eastern District of 
Louisiana”). An additional conflict exists in DBA cases, which explains why the employer in 
Zimmerman filed in multiple district courts. Cases are typically heard by an ALJ, and the ALJ’s 
order is then filed with the district director where the case originated. 20 C.F.R. § 702.349 (2000) 
(“The administrative law judge shall . . . deliver by mail, or otherwise, to the office of the district 
director having original jurisdiction . . . .”). The text of the DBA requires appeals to be filed in the 
“district wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation order is 
involved.” Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (2000). Because the 1972 Longshore Act 
amendments split the responsibilities of the deputy commissioner between the district director and 
the ALJ, it is unclear whether the relevant district is the office of the ALJ or district director. See 
Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 217−18 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding 
that the case should be brought in the district containing the office of the district director who 
handled the claim). While this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it adds a further level of 
uncertainty for DBA workers. Id.  
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the potential for duplicative litigation, an obvious example of waste of 
judicial resources.159 
Finally, forcing these claims through a lengthier process and 
additional level of review is potentially harmful to both claimants and 
employers.160 If a worker’s claim is denied at the administrative level, 
the claimant must forgo compensation for a longer period of time while 
his or her claim winds its way through the review process.161 If a worker 
wins at the administrative level, the employer will be forced to pay 
benefits while an appeal is pending,162 and the Longshore Act prevents 
the employer from recovering those payments from the worker 
directly.163 
In sum, interpretation of the DBA involves an examination of its plain 
text and the text of related Acts—specifically the Longshore Act. If the 
plain text does not resolve the question, canons such as in pari materia 
and policy considerations aid interpretation. Judicial treatment of other 
statutes based on the Longshore Act, such as the BLBA and NFIA, can 
also provide guidance in resolving this question. 
IV.  PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF THE DBA AND POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 
COURTS OF APPEALS 
The plain text of the DBA’s jurisdictional provision is ambiguous,164 
and the potential for multiple interpretations necessitates a thorough 
                                                     
159. Cf. Tyrer v. City of S. Beloit, 456 F.3d 744, 756 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing how dual federal 
and state proceedings would “waste the parties’ resources, risk duplicative rulings and reward a 
strategic gamesmanship . . . .”). 
160. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 342, 349 (1976) (explaining that “hardship imposed 
upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant,” although holding that a 
post-deprivation hearing is not necessary to satisfy due process). 
161. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000) (“The 
payment of the amounts required by an award shall not be stayed pending final decision in any such 
proceeding unless ordered by the court. No stay shall be issued unless irreparable injury would 
otherwise ensue to the employer or carrier.”). 
162. If the ALJ has directed the employer to pay compensation benefits, it must do so. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 914(f) (2000) (charging twenty percent interest penalty if a compensation award is not paid within 
ten days). 
163. None of the three sections of the Longshore Act allowing for recovery of overpayments—§§ 
14(f), 8(j), and 22—provide for the direct recovery of overpayment from the worker. See Ceres Gulf 
v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[The Longshore Act] does not provide an 
employer with a right to recover advance payments wrongfully paid, such as through fraud, when no 
[Longshore Act] compensation is owed.”). 
164. See infra Part IV.A. 
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statutory analysis.165 The canon in pari materia, legislative history, and 
the judicial treatment of other Longshore Act amendments all weigh in 
favor of judicial review in the courts of appeals.166 Public policy 
concerns also strongly indicate that the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
represents the best solution to this judicial dilemma.167 Judicial review of 
agency determinations under the DBA should occur in the court of 
appeals.168 
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 3(b) of the DBA, Taken in Context, is 
Unclear 
The plain text of section 3(b) is unclear, and the circuits that relied on 
plain text to interpret section 3(b) of the DBA did so erroneously.169 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted a plain text inquiry to include text and 
context,170 requiring a holistic inquiry that includes the texts of the 
immediate and related acts.171 The language of the DBA’s jurisdictional 
provision reads in part: “[j]udicial proceedings provided under Section 
18 and 21 of the [Longshore] Act in respect to a compensation 
order . . . .”172 The explicit reference to the Longshore Act mandates that 
the two provisions be viewed together.173 When viewed together in 
context, the two provisions directly contradict each other: the DBA 
requires judicial review in “district court,”174 whereas the Longshore Act 
requires review in the “court of appeals.”175 While this textual 
inconsistency could perhaps be resolved by adopting the broad view of 
                                                     
165. See supra Part I.D. 
166. See infra Part IV.B and IV.C. 
167. See infra Part IV.D. 
168. See infra Parts IV.A−IV.D. 
169. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (2000) (“Judicial proceedings provided under 
Section 18 and 21 of the [Longshore] Act in respect to a compensation order . . . .”); see supra note 
95. 
170. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (discussing how ambiguity is 
determined through reference to the plain text and context). 
171. Rowland v. Cal. Mens Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S. 194, 199 (1993). 
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b) (emphasis added). 
173. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938) (“Where one statute adopts the particular 
provisions of another . . . the effect is the same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been 
incorporated bodily into the adopting statute.”) (quoting J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 787–88 (John Lewis, ed., 2d ed. 1904); see also United States v. 
Griner, 358 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding cross reference has been incorporated bodily). 
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
175. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (2000). 
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modification, none of the circuit courts that relied on the plain text even 
addressed modification.176 The direct conflict confounds the plain text 
meaning of the DBA and indicates that a more thorough inquiry is 
required. 177 
B. Legislative Purpose Demonstrates that the DBA’s Role is Best 
Served Through Procedures Parallel to the Longshore Act 
Legislative purpose indicates that judicial review of administrative 
decisions in DBA cases should occur in the court of appeals.178 Congress 
enacted the DBA to provide overseas workers with compensation 
coverage that would be parallel to coverage provided to their domestic 
counterparts.179 Congress decided that claimants proceeding under these 
Acts would follow the same procedural paths, incorporating the 
jurisdictional provisions of the Longshore Act into the DBA180 and 
                                                     
176. See Hice v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 156 F.3d 214, 218 (D.C. Cir. 1998); 
Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir. 1997); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. Felkner, 930 
F.2d 1111, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991); Home Indemn. Co. v. Stillwell, 597 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1979). 
177. Where a statute is subject to multiple interpretations, courts often give deference to agency 
interpretation. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 US 837, 842−43 (1984) 
(explaining that if Congress has not unambiguously spoken to the question at issue, deference is 
given to the administering agency). The Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, seen through 
the opinion of the District Director, believes proper jurisdiction is in the court of appeals. See ITT 
Base Servs. v. Hickson, 155 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the district director 
thinks “the reading we adopt today will create an unintended disparity between the judicial 
provisions of the [Longshore Act] and those of the DBA . . . . Congress intended the 1972 
amendments to remove district court jurisdiction uniformly . . . .”). If the Agency did receive 
deference, it would likely receive discretionary deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134 (1944), as the opinion of the agency has not promulgated a rule or regulation in this area which 
would entitle it to binding deference. See generally Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of 
Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 
DUKE L.J. 166, 171 (1992) (“[T]he level of judicial deference to an agency opinion depends on the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position as measured by the thoroughness of its investigation in 
making the ruling, the validity of its reasoning, and the consistency of the present agency position 
with earlier rulings.”). Some might argue that agency interpretations of procedural provisions 
deserve no deference, as agencies do not have special expertise regarding procedure. See Melissa M. 
Berry, Beyond Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions. 30 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 587−89 (2007). 
178. See S. REP. NO. 77-540, at 1 (1941) (“Section 1 of the bill extends the provisions of the 
[Longshore] Act.”). 
179. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Cf. Longmire v. Sea Drilling Corp., 610 F.2d 
1342, 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that Congress intended, by adopting provisions of the 
Longshore Act, for workers injured under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to be “in the same 
position as longshoremen”). 
180. Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000) (adopting the provisions of the Longshore 
Act for workers injured under the DBA). 
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modifying the language only slightly through section 3(b).181 The 
portion of section 3(b) that performed a modifying function was that 
which substituted “wherein is located the office of deputy 
commissioner”182 for “in which the injury occurred.”183 This was the 
meaningful modification of the incorporated language.184 The inclusion 
of the “district court” language simply mirrored the text of the 
Longshore Act. 
While congressional history on the issue is sparse, the changes in the 
workers’ compensation scheme reveal a concern for more efficient 
proceedings, not a desire to alter the consistency with which the Acts 
had been reviewed.185 As Judge Hall pointed out in his dissent in Lee v. 
Boeing Co.,186 it is unlikely that Congress intended workers who 
suffered the misfortune of being injured abroad to have to wait longer 
than their domestic counterparts for final resolution of their claim.187 To 
the contrary, there is evidence that Congress intended for the 1972 
Longshore Act amendments to streamline the jurisdictional process and 
save judicial resources.188 The interpretation that forces cases to wind 
                                                     
181. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b); see Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 
770 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[F]or Defense Base Act cases, the proper court of appeals is in the circuit 
‘wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose compensation order is 
involved.’”). 
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1653(b). 
183. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1970) 
(amended 1972). 
184. Pearce, 603 F.2d at 770 (“The language immediately following: ‘of the judicial district 
wherein is located the office . . .’  is the modifying language.”). 
185. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Nat’l Mines Corp., 554 F.2d 1267, 1273 
(4th Cir. 1977) (“[N]o sound reason has been advanced why Congress should have wished to 
exclude any particular compensation program from utilizing the reformed procedures for 
adjudicating claims provided by these [1972 Longshore Act] amendments.”); Lee v. Boeing Co., 
123 F.3d 801, 808 (4th Cir. 1997) (Hall, J., dissenting) (“Prior to 1972, claims made pursuant to the 
DBA were reviewed in the same manner as those arising under the [Longshore Act] . . . why would 
Congress have suddenly decided to treat these similar types of claims in a radically different 
manner? The answer, of course, is that Congress did not so decide. It expected, and rightly so, that 
an amendment of the [Longshore Act] would be, in essence, an amendment of all the compensation 
statutes . . . . ”). 
186. 123 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 1997). 
187. See id. at 808 (Hall, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe Congress intended that workers 
unfortunate enough to have been injured in a foreign land have the final resolution of their claims 
take months or years longer than those filed by workers in this country who suffer identical 
injuries.”). 
188. S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 4 (1972) (“The social costs of these law suits, the delays, crowding 
of court calendars and the need to pay for lawyers’ services have seldom resulted in a real increase 
in actual benefits for injured workers.”); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 5 (1972), reprinted in 1972 
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through a circuitous review path directly contravenes this congressional 
intent.189 
This undesirable result can be avoided by accepting the Ninth 
Circuit’s more limited view of the modification.190 Under this 
interpretation, the provisions of the DBA and the Longshore Act work in 
tandem, with section 21(c) of the Longshore Act providing jurisdiction 
in the courts of appeals, and section 3(b) of the DBA making a limited 
substitution that determines the appropriate circuit.191 In sum, the DBA, 
based on the amended Longshore Act, should effectively read: “may 
obtain review of that order in the United States court of appeals for the 
circuit wherein is located the office of the deputy commissioner whose 
compensation order is involved.”192 
C. In Pari Materia Indicates that the DBA Should be Interpreted in 
Light of Analogous Longshore Act Extensions 
The canon of statutory construction in pari materia counsels that 
statutes that are part of the same legislative scheme or aim to accomplish 
similar purposes should be read in tandem.193 Congress, through the 
Longshore Act and its numerous extensions, has created a 
comprehensive scheme to provide uniform workers’ compensation 
coverage to a variety of workers.194 In light of the congressional attempt 
to guarantee uniformity in this area, courts have reconciled potential 
procedural differences under the other Longshore Act extensions in 
                                                     
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4702 (“The Committee heard testimony that the number of third-party actions 
brought under the Sieracki and Ryan line of decisions has increased substantially in recent years and 
that much of the financial resources which could better be utilized to pay improved compensation 
benefits were now being spent to defray litigation costs.”); see also Ramirez v. Toko Kaiun K.K., 
385 F. Supp. 644, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (“The main reason for the [1972 Longshore Act] 
Amendments was to obviate the increased litigation costs and the unwarranted expenditure of court 
time under the old system.”). 
189. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 5. 
190. See Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979). 
191. Id. (“When the 1972 amendment to the [Longshore] Act abolished the jurisdiction of the 
district courts . . . the phrase ‘in the United States District Court’ in § 3(b) of the Defense Base Act 
became inoperative; in effect, it was repealed. The language immediately following, however, still 
had a role to perform.”). 
192. Text in italics is the portion of the DBA that made the operative modification. 
193. See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (stating that it is “plain” that the 
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 and the Revenue Act of 1916 are in pari materia, as they were 
enacted by Congress in the same legislative session and deal with the same subject matter).  
194. See supra note 132. 
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favor of retaining parallel procedures.195 In the case of the procedural 
conundrum created by congressional cross-reference and amendments 
under the BLBA,196 the Sixth Circuit used the doctrine of in pari materia 
to support its holding that the BLBA incorporated the new Longshore 
Act procedures.197 The court found that the Longshore Act amendments 
evidenced a general congressional intent to replace “outmoded and 
unsatisfactory past methods of review” and used in pari materia to 
further that intent.198 
In pari materia also requires courts to interpret the NFIA and the 
DBA similarly.199 The NFIA jurisdictional provision is nearly identical 
to that in DBA.200 When deciding a case which presented the 
jurisdictional inconsistency between the NFIA and the Longshore Act, 
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals assumed that the NFIA 
incorporated the 1972 Longshore Act amendments and decided the case 
on the merits.201 Courts should interpret cases dealing with the nearly 
identical language of the DBA similarly. Such an interpretation would 
create a harmonious interpretation that guarantees parallel procedures 
under all Longshore Act extensions, furthering the legislative intent 
underlying this statutory scheme.202 The application of in pari materia to 
cases under the BLBA and NFIA further supports the narrow view of 
modification in the DBA.203 
                                                     
195. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d 310, 315 (7th 
Cir. 1977) (quoting the Secretary of Labor who “observed that any substantial deviation from the 
adjudicatory scheme provided in the [Longshore Act] could seriously jeopardize the appellate 
procedures . . . .”). 
196. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 (1972) (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. §901 (2000)). 
197. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. E. Coal Corp., 561 F.2d 632, 638–39 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
198. Id. 
199. NFIA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8171–8173 (2000). 
200. Id. § 8171(d) (“Judicial proceedings . . . with respect to an injury or death occurring outside 
the continental United States shall be instituted in the district court within the territorial jurisdiction 
of which is located the office of the deputy commissioner . . . .”). 
201. See Symanowicz v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 672 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(deciding a workers’ compensation claim arising under the NFIA). 
202. Cf. Linquist v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying in pari materia because 
the Railroad Retirement Act provision incorporated the text of the Social Security Act, and 
considering the congressional intent behind the entire worker retirement benefit scheme in 
determining how the acts should be applied in tandem). 
203. See Pearce v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 770 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“The language immediately following: ‘of the judicial district wherein is located the office . . . ’ is 
the modifying language.”). 
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D. Policy Considerations Demonstrate that Judicial Review Must 
Take Place in the Courts of Appeals to Ensure Fair and Proper 
Adjudication Under the DBA 
The lack of uniformity between the circuits wastes judicial resources 
in numerous ways. First, the uncertainty in the law regarding where to 
file will likely increase litigation costs in DBA cases.204 A concrete 
example of this uncertainty is seen in the recently filed case Service 
Employers International v. Zimmerman, where the employer filed 
protective suits in three different courts.205 Second, the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs will have to promulgate different 
rules and literature for each circuit, depending on the favored forum in 
that circuit.206 
Third, requiring jurisdiction in the district courts is cumbersome and 
duplicative; even the circuits that have required district court review 
have admitted this.207 When reviewing cases under the DBA, both the 
district courts and courts of appeals apply the same standard of review, 
and the district court and Board serve the same function.208 Because each 
court engages in the same review and analysis,209 district court review 
adds little to the process. Finally, forcing these claims to go through an 
additional level of review will be more costly for both claimants and 
employers, regardless of who wins at the Board.210 The effective 
outcome does not further congressional intent to provide workers injured 
overseas with the same protection afforded those injured in the United 
                                                     
204. These litigation costs often have to be borne by the employer. See Holliday v. Todd 
Shipyards, Corp., 654 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1981) (“When an employer contests its liability for 
compensation . . . and the claimant is ultimately successful, the employer and not the claimant must 
pay the claimant’s attorney’s fees.”) (quoting Hole v. Miami Shipyards, Co., 640 F.2d 769, 774 (5th 
Cir. 1981)) (emphasis in original). 
205. Brief for the Petitioner at 23 n.1, Service Employers Int’l, Inc. v. Zimmerman, No. 06-3903-
ag (2d Cir. 2007). 
206. In Lee v. Boeing Co., 123 F.3d 801, 807 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit quoted the 
paperwork the claimant had received from the Board. These documents stated: “Attached please 
find an outline of the procedures for appealing to the courts of appeals.” (emphasis in original). 
207. Id. at 806 (acknowledging that its decision will result in a review procedure which is 
cumbersome and duplicative); AFIA/CIGNA Worldwide v. Felkner, 930 F.2d 1111, 1117 (5th Cir. 
1991) (discussing “redundant steps insinuated by the 1972 amendments to the [Longshore Act]”). 
208. See supra notes 50−51 and accompanying text. 
209. See H.B. Zachry Co. v. Quinones, 206 F.3d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). 
210. See supra notes 161−163 and accompanying text. 
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States.211 Instead, it subjects workers injured abroad to additional 
procedural complexities, delay, and expense.212  
CONCLUSION 
The increase in the number of civilian contractors working overseas 
in connection with American military action has raised the profile of the 
once obscure DBA. The complex relationship between the Longshore 
Act and the DBA has caused significant confusion and uncertainty as 
claimants under the DBA seek judicial review. Although courts agree 
that the DBA adopted subsequent amendments to the Longshore Act, 
courts have split over the proper scope of the DBA jurisdictional 
provision and the proper forum for judicial review. Careful review of the 
statutory text, canons of construction, legislative history, and public 
policy supports the finding that judicial review under the DBA begins in 
the courts of appeals. This approach conserves judicial resources, 
furthers statutory purpose, and provides clarity in the resolution of 
claims brought by a critical, growing class of workers. 
 
                                                     
211. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-1070 at 2 (1941) (“[T]o provide substantially the same relief for 
injuries or death of employees at bases . . . as existing law affords similar employees in the United 
States . . . .” ). 
212. Lee, 123 F.3d at 808 (Hall, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe Congress intended that workers 
unfortunate enough to have been injured in a foreign land have the final resolution of their claims 
take months or years longer than those filed by workers in this country who suffer identical 
injuries.”). 
